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Abstract 
 
The US and Canada have been at the forefront of shale oil and gas development via hydraulic 
fracturing. Understanding public perceptions is important given the role that they may play in future 
policy decisions in both North America and other parts of the world where shale development is at a 
much earlier stage. We review 58 articles pertaining to perceptions, published between 2009 and 
2015. Studies report mixed levels of awareness of shale operations, tending towards higher 
awareness in areas with existing development. While individuals tend to have negative associations 
with the term ͚fraĐkiŶg͛, views on shale development are mixed as to whether benefits outweigh 
risks or vice versa: perceived benefits tend to be economic (e.g., job creation, boosts to local 
economies) and risks more commonly environmental and/or social (e.g., impacts on water, 
increased traffic). Some papers point to ethical issues (e.g., inequitable risk/benefit distribution, 
procedural justice) and widespread distrust of responsible parties, stemming from perceived 
unfairness, heavy-handed corporate tactics, and lack of transparency. These findings point to the 
contested, political character of much of the debate about hydraulic fracturing, and raise questions 
of what constitutes ͚acceptable͛ risk in this context. We compare these results with research 
emerging in the UK over the same period.  Future research should focus on nuanced inquiry, a range 
of methodologies and explore perceptions in varied social and geographical contexts. Both this and 
future research hold the potential to enhance public debates and decisions about shale gas and oil 
development.    
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Shale rocks are widely distributed globally, and many countries have started to investigate their 
potential for shale gas and oil. The US and Canada have been at the forefront of development, 
where exploitation of shale oil and gas has been made possible by favorable market conditions and 
government investment, alongside the development of directional and horizontal drilling, 3D seismic 
imaging, and importantly by hydraulic fracturing ;͚fraĐkiŶg͛Ϳ techniques, whereby pressurized liquid 
and sand are injected deep into the earth to fracture the shale and to facilitate the flow of oil and 
gas. Such techniques have been deployed for up to 20 years in some US states, and shale 
development has grown significantly in the last ten years, leading the US to become the ǁorld͛s 
largest producer of oil and gas.1 In some cases full-scale extraction is taking place (e.g., Pennsylvania, 
Wyoming, Texas). In others, proposals to implement have been surrounded by significant 
environmental and legal controversy, on occasion leading to local, regional or state-wide moratoria 
and bans (e.g., New York, Maryland). In Canada, rapid development has concentrated in the western 
provinces of British Columbia and Alberta,2 while the practice has been the subject of moratoria and 
bans in eastern provinces (Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick).  
Proponents argue that shale gas, being cleaner burning than coal, provides a superior ͚ďridge fuel͛ to 
a lower carbon economy. They also argue that, as conventional reserves decline, domestic 
production can be one way to reduce future dependency on imported gas/oil. On the other hand, 
scientists forecast that much of the ǁorld͛s known fossil fuel reserves must remain in the ground if 
global warming is to be limited to 2oC above pre-industrial levels.3 More localized concerns relate to 
impacts including potential risks of water contamination and induced seismicity4, 5 as well as social 
and health effects.6-8  
Public perceptions of energy technologies have been a topic of significant academic and policy 
research in Europe and North America for over 30 years9-11. That work has investigated in detail 
public attitudes towards issues such as nuclear power and radioactive waste storage, renewable 
energy proposals including  marine and onshore wind, the use of fossil fuels with carbon capture and 
storage, and latterly shale gas and oil exploration. Such research is stimulated by a desire to gain 
fundamental knowledge about the social and political processes that underlie publicly available 
discourses and representations of a risky technology, alongside the factors that drive individual 
attitudes.  We know for example from previous work on perceptions of energy and other 
controversial technologies, that people͛s attitudes to environmental and technological risks involve a 
range of concerns and value-based questions that go beyond the formal measurement of risk.12 
These include not only any perceived risks and benefits, but also iŶdiǀiduals͛ cultural values and 
worldviews, spontaneous associations and affective responses, concerns about both distributional  
and procedural equity, levels of trust in risk governance and regulation, and concerns relating to 
such things as the protection of valued landscapes.13-16 Indeed, the emergence of intense local risk 
controversies is rarely, if ever, solely about risk alone, but typically involves a combination of 
dynamic social and political issues that pose severe threats to locally valued places and identities, 
and in turn serve to amplify existing risk perceptions.17, 18 Although the notion of risk ͚aĐĐeptaďilitǇ͛ is 
in itself a complex and contingent concept13, 16, 18 knowledge of public views about energy options 
such as unconventional hydrocarbons should contribute to wider debates within society about what 
choices and options might eventually lead to more environmentally sustainable and publicly 
acceptable future energy systems – as when, for example, a publicly acceptable technology is not 
the most sustainable long-run option for society, or vice versa. 
The empirical studies reviewed here are all aimed at gaining an understanding of various publics͛ 
perceptions of shale developments, and are important for three principal reasons. First, some will 
have been explicitly designed to explore and test key social science hypotheses  derived primarily 
from existing theory and research with other controversial technologies regarding the preconditions 
and processes which might also underlie developing perceptions of shale gas and oil developments, 
whilst also recognizing that every new issue may have its own subtle contextual differences. Second, 
and as a more critical project, such studies can serve to provide properly-grounded empirical 
evidence of the varied views of communities and individuals who are faced with risks (both social 
and environmental) from shale development and how these views can, in turn, be given effective 
voice alongside the framings and discourses of other actors in the debate The latter are often 
outside corporate or government interests seeking to push forward shale gas development in a local 
area or community. The differing framings of actors often become key points of debate in major risk 
controversies, serving to anchor options and either to close down or open up an issue to wider 
public scrutiny and debate19, 20 (e.g. should shale development be framed as a ͚ĐoŶtriďutioŶ to 
national energy seĐuritǇ͛, as a ͚risk of environmental ĐoŶtaŵiŶatioŶ͛, or as both?). Properly-
grounded evidence of public views, through conducting studies such as those reviewed here, is one 
means by which local publics can themselves become actors in the framing of such debates, and is in 
turn one way of ensuring that the frames of powerful external actors do not come to dominate both 
debate and decision-making. Finally, and as a matter of transparency in public policy, we need to 
know the extent to which knowledge of the many puďliĐs͛ perceptions, and the deeper values and 
concerns that they often represent, can be useful  for guiding better policy engagement and 
decision-making as part of more deliberative approaches to shale risk governance21, 22, 23. This is the 
case for both the US and Canada, where development is ongoing, and in other regions where shale 
development is at the earliest stages. In Europe, a number of countries have already banned fracking 
for shale gas and oil (e.g., France) or implemented a moratorium (e.g., Germany).24 Conversely, the 
national UK and Polish governments have taken a different stance, and openly support shale 
development. Poland is at the most advanced stage of the EU nations, with over 100 exploratory 
wells drilled, although these have yielded disappointing results so far.25 In the UK, while there are a 
number of active petroleum exploration and development licenses (PEDLs), progress has been slow, 
with just one shale well having been drilled and hydraulically fractured.26 Here, future development 
may largely hinge on public acceptability, and while the number of studies exploring the social 
dimensions of shale development in the UK are growing,24 the topic remains under-explored.27  
Notwithstanding the significant differences in the operating environments, we can learn much that 
will help to anticipate the emergence of public representations and debates about shale 
development in other contexts by reviewing what has already occurred in North America where 
operations are more established. It is important also, in reviewing what is currently known about 
perceptions, to recognize the plural nature of ͚publics͛ – and that there can never be one single 
public attitude or belief about ͚risk͛, just multiple publics with differing worldviews, knowledges and 
experiences concerning the technology in question and its impacts upon them13.  Equally, attitudes 
and preferences towards (often unfamiliar) technologies, not only shale gas development (e.g. 
133,134), are rarely simply fixed entities, but are often conditional, ambivalent, labile, and even 
seemingly contradictory for the same individual17. Attitudes, on this reading, become sensitive to the 
methodology of their elicitation as much as to the wider questions of socio-political context that 
drive preferences. Under such circumstances, the task of studying what counts as ͚aĐĐeptaďle͛ risk 
becomes as much a matter of exploring through different methods the varied boundary conditions 
that a person places upon ͚acceptability͛16, 127 as it is one of revealing the more fundamental values 
through which people and society construct their beliefs about a technology more generally13.  The 
value of a review such as the present one is that it begins to document some of that variability 
across locations, communities and various empirical methodologies.      
In this chapter we first present the methodology used in this review, before discussing the findings 
of the articles that we reviewed - including findings relating to attitudes around shale development 
and environmental impacts, climate change, and energy systems. We then make comparisons 
between emerging UK perceptions of shale development and those of US and Canadian publics, 
before considering future research needs in this field.  
Systematic literature review  
Articles were selected for review in two phases. First, the literature was tracked using various news 
websites, academic feeds and website ͚searĐh alerts͛ during the 18 months prior to the review taking 
place in the summer of 2015. Second, in July 2015, we carried out a systematic search for terms such 
as ͚hǇdrauliĐ fraĐturiŶg͛, ͚fraĐkiŶg͛, ͚shale͛, ͚eŶergǇ and public opiŶioŶ͛ and ͚drilliŶg and public 
opiŶioŶ͛ using Google Scholar and the UCSB Social Science Database, which is hosted by Web of 
Science and includes all major English language social science journals. We began by searching the 
University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB) Social Science Database for these terms within the 
abstracts of articles only, to find the most relevant to our review. We also searched for specific 
authors who we were aware had been active in the field, and those citing them. We followed this by 
searching for the same terms within the full text of the articles to ensure no relevant articles were 
overlooked, and by searching Google Scholar, which includes a greater variety of publications. For all 
relevant articles, we reviewed the included citations, and those who cited the articles, to search for 
other articles, publications, and documents that may have been overlooked or not included in the 
database search. 
From the thousands of returned search results that included non-relevant literature and research on 
a wide range of topics and energy issues, we aimed to balance comprehensive cover with a specific 
focus on public perceptions of hydraulic fracturing for shale gas and oil in the United States and 
Canada. Thus for this literature review, we included all articles found that were directly about public 
perceptions, attitudes, or opinions about fracking. Additionally, we included articles that used 
fracking as a case study of some larger, theoretical concept, but included data about public 
perceptions of fracking. We excluded articles that analysed media reporting alone, or ones which 
discussed fracking or used fracking as a case study if there was no original data about public 
perceptions. Once selected, the articles were analyzed for themes based on our initial reading of the 
articles and those relating to wider energy perceptions. These themes included awareness, attitudes, 
risk/benefit perceptions, and comparisons with other energy options. The articles were then 
examined for the details of how these topics manifested, and other emergent themes were 
recorded. We finally synthesized the findings to form the basis of our discussion below. 
We primarily focus on peer reviewed academic literature, but also include relevant reports from 
think tanks, NGOs, governmental departments and universities (termed ͚greǇ-literature͛Ϳ. We use 
the term ͚puďliĐ͛ broadly, and the review includes the perceptions of other stakeholders such as 
landowners, educators and government officials. It is worth noting however that most of the articles 
use broader ͚laǇ͛ publics as their samples. We include perceptions of both shale oil and gas in the 
review, but do not differentiate between the two in our analysis because the reviewed articles often 
do not make a clear distinction. Throughout the review we use the terms ͚shale deǀelopŵeŶt͛ and 
͚shale operatioŶs͛ as short hand for the process of extracting shale gas and/or oil via hydraulic 
fracturing, encompassing the range of terms used to describe the issue.  
 
PERCEPTIONS OF SHALE OPERATIONS IN THE US AND CANADA  
Overview: research in the US and Canada  
The articles that we reviewed are summarized in Table 1. More information can be found in the 
supplementary material, which describes the type of source article (e.g., refereed journal, research 
report) as well as the study locations, methods and sample details for each publication.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
As shown in Figure 1 (below), the frequency of publications about shale perceptions in the US and 
Canada has increased steadily in recent years. While research in this field can be charted since 2009, 
the vast majority has been published since 2013, reflecting a growing interest in the field. Table 1 
shows that research in this area has been both qualitative and quantitative in nature (particularly 
interviews and surveys) but with a stronger focus on quantitative research, particularly within the 
grey-literature. Notably, qualitative research has focused on interested and affected parties -such as 
landowners, farmers and local educators- while quantitative research has focused more on the 
general population, often using representative and/or national samples. Research in North America 
has focused mainly on the US, with a particularly strong emphasis on the Marcellus shale area, a 
large play in the northeast of the country that has experienced some of the most intensive 
development.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Awareness of hydraulic fracturing for shale gas and oil 
More than half of the publications in our review gauged awareness of shale operations in some way. 
Research in this area was commonly quantitative, but did include some qualitative data from 
interviews and focus groups. Mass media28 and particularly newspapers29-31 were important sources 
of information on the topic of shale operations, with additional key information sources identified 
as: industry and conservation/environmental groups,30 landowner coalitions,32 and peers via word of 
mouth.33 It is worth noting that level of awareness is likely to depend on question wording, as shown 
in a US survey study by Evensen et al34 in which substantially more survey respondents were able to 
recognize the phrase ͚shale gas deǀelopŵeŶt͛ compared with the term ͚fraĐkiŶg͛. Levels of reported 
awareness and knowledge are also likely to depend on the style of questioning; the majority of the 
publications reported here used self-reported measures (e.g., refs 30, 35-38) as opposed to 
independently assessing knowledge in some way (e.g., ref 39). While self-report measures are easier 
to administer and pose less risk of respondents declining to complete a ͚kŶoǁledge test͛, they can 
lead to biased responses.40  
Broadly, findings indicate that close to 50% of individuals in areas exposed to shale operations, or 
with the potential for such activity, are aware of the issue.41-43 Nevertheless, research frequently 
highlighted variations in levels of awareness. In surveys drawing on national US samples, awareness 
was shown to be much lower than in surveys of areas proximate to development.36, 44, 45 Indeed, 
numerous studies found that awareness differs across regions, typically asserting that awareness is 
higher in states, counties, or regions either closer to development or with higher density 
development.30, 31, 33, 41, 42, 46, 47 However, Stedman et al.37 found no significant differences between 
New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians in levels of perceived knowledge of Marcellus-related impacts or 
procedures, despite different levels of development in each state (although we may expect 
knowledge to be relatively high in New York due to media coverage of the state͛s shale moratorium). 
In the only repeated survey analysis of awareness in our sample, Brooks48 showed that awareness in 
the US increased moderately over time (from 32% to 42% over one year).  
Although few studies discuss the relationship between awareness and support for and/or opposition 
to shale development, the ones that do suggest that this relationship is either non-existent39, 49 or 
tenuous at best.50 Echoing years of commentary on the ͚defiĐit ŵodel͛ of risk communication,51 
researchers therefore caution against concluding that ͚eduĐatioŶ͛ can change support/opposition on 
this issue.50, 52  
Risk and benefit perceptions 
Most of the reviewed articles considered risk/benefit perceptions in some form, usually explored via 
survey approaches. Particularly widespread were discussions of risk. This may be due to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it may be because risks are more prevalent and/or serious than the benefits. It may 
be a function of the negative effects of shale development being more noticeable, memorable, or 
impactful than the positive effects.35 Or, it may be because of the balance afforded to risks and 
benefits in perception studies: risk perceptions have been given more critical attention than benefit 
perceptions in the field of nanotechnology for example,53 and Graham et al.54 have recently 
suggested that surveys of public opinion about fracking have tended to address potential risks more 
than potential benefits. This focus on risk may also be a function of sampling methods, which in 
qualitative research in particular has focused on interested and affected parties and impacted 
communities (Table 1). Particular framing of research questions may also play a role: for example 
Israel et al.55 asked their participants about ͚ĐoŶĐerŶs͛, thus potentially leading to a focus on risks 
rather than benefits.  
Benefit perceptions  
Perceived benefits of shale development tend to be economic.46, 56 By far the most commonly cited 
involve jobs27, 30, 42, 46, 57-60 and boosts to local and individual economies27, 32, 46, 59 for example due to 
increased business and investment activity.30, 42, 46, 58 When asked, people perceive employment 
benefits to be important or very important,30 and overwhelming majorities in both Michigan and 
Pennsylvania believe that hydraulic fracturing is very or somewhat important to their state͛s 
economy (82% Michigan, 84% Pennsylvania), despite different levels of fracking in each.42 However, 
research by Hudgins61 and Jacquet62 suggests the reality is different, in that jobs for local people can 
be few; findings that reflect a body of work emerging on the negative and limited nature of the 
economic impacts of shale gas, and reminiscent of historical US boom-bust cycles.63, 64 Other 
perceived benefits include poverty alleviation,60 energy independence,42 and improvements in 
services such as local police/fire protection, medical and health care facilities.58, 60 The potential 
climate change benefits (of shale gas being a cleaner burning fossil fuel than coal) are relatively 
lacking amongst the benefit perceptions cited (though see Brooks48). Perceptions of potential 
climate change risks are discussed below.   
Risk perceptions  
Perceived risks tend to be environmental or social.46, 56 Impacts on water are some of the most 
commonly cited,27, 42, 43, 46, 47, 55, 58, 60, 65, 66 and important30, 41 of risks, and mainly focus on 
contamination rather than usage (again, a number of findings are from closed survey questions 
rather than open-ended items or interviews, thus limiting the scope of responses). Other 
environmental impacts of concern to the publics in this review include generic ͚risks to the 
eŶǀiroŶŵeŶt͛47 as well as air pollution,65 damage to the land and landscape,27 and associated 
impacts on wildlife.46, 67  
The most commonly cited social risks are the impacts of shale exploitation on traffic, road safety and 
road conditions.46, 59, 60, 65, 67-69 More broadly, individual and community health and safety were of 
concern in reports by Ferrar et al.6, Jaspal et al.27 and Wynveen69. Participants also perceived issues 
of noise and/or light pollution58, 65, 67 and changes to the aesthetic value of the landscape/scenic 
beauty.46, 57, 65, 69 Also of concern is the population influx caused by shale development27, 46, 57, 58, 68 
and the associated risks of crime,46 inconvenience/social disruption,7, 65, 69 people not sharing the 
local way of life,46 strained services/infrastructure,46, 68 housing availability27, 46 and stress46. Although 
economic factors tend to be associated with benefits, they are not totally absent from risk concerns, 
for example through shale development crowding out other industries.55 
Participants also spoke of threats to rural lifestyles,46 ͚upeŶded community ŵeaŶiŶgs͛,7 the 
industrialization of small towns,27 and a reduced ability to enjoy local natural amenities.67 Perry70 
discusses how the psychological and sociocultural impacts of shale gas development on Bradford 
County, Pennsylvania, may evidence a phenomenon called ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe trauŵa͛ in which a 
community's bonds are slowly but substantially weakened. Evensen71 ties the changes in the 
character of small, rural communities (and the resulting impacts on place meanings and place 
attachment) to the concept of philosophical perfectionism, whereby shale operations affect 
respoŶdeŶts͛ capacity to live or attain ͚the good life͛. Several authors also explain how rapid 
industrialization, increased intra-community conflict, an influx of outsiders, prominent changes in 
the landscape and associated psychological stress can also lead to threats to place identities and 
place attachment.7, 57, 67, 69, 70 As has been illustrated with other technologies72 at a local level such 
objections are often denigrated by developers, governments and the media as examples of a NIMBY 
(not in my backyard) response. This is the idea that people support a development in principle, as a 
common good, but then object to it near their home because they see local risks and little benefit.   
However, such a perspective is rarely adequate to understand such disputes – where peoples͛ 
everyday experiences, and their notions of morality and obligation, are important to their locally-
based identities.73 As a result, contemporary thinking is that NIMBY is a highly misleading label that 
both risks denigrating opponents while over-simplifying what prompts local concerns, and at the 
very real risk of further alienating members of local communities that are being asked to host such 
developments.16,74,75 The evidence with shale operations is that likewise NIMBY cannot adequately 
explain opposition to these operations either.49, 50, 57 These findings are also consistent with wider 
literature on local experience of other environmental and technological hazards and risks, where it is 
commonly observed that people͛s concerns can raise perfectly legitimate issues (as seen from the 
perspective of local residents) which are not easily accommodated in formal risk assessments for the 
technology in question. Seen in these terms local knowledges and perspectives are not something to 
be challenged by more information provision, or appeals to NIMBYism, but become an important 
means of critiquing and extending the scope of the more formal assessments of risk.76, 77 
 
It is of note that whilst accelerated climate change has been cited as among the most significant 
impacts of shale exploitation, due to methane emissions and lock-in at the expense of renewable 
energy sources,78 it features remarkably little in the articles that we reviewed. Willow (p.147)79 
observes that ͚ǁhile several people I spoke with did list carbon emissions/climate change as a 
detrimental outcome of fracking, this issue has not emerged as a major motive for grassroots 
oppositioŶ͛, and Clarke et al. (p.137)80 comment that ͚ǀerǇ few participants who mentioned 
environmental associations actually touched on climate ĐhaŶge͛.  This low salience may be because 
chemical contamination is a more immediate threat while climate change is a ͚distaŶt͛ risk,81, 82,83 
perceived as something that will happen to other places and peoples in a distant time. Indeed, 
results do indicate that while some media27 (though see ref 29), stakeholders 58 and ͚iŶterested and 
affected parties͛ 55 cite climate change as an issue, public respondents in studies tend to be 
concerned with more immediate, localized effects such as social impacts and water contamination. 
However, the relationship between the localized impacts of climate change and risk perceptions is a 
complex one, and the research on this issue shows that climate threats can simultaneously hold both 
localized and global associations.84 Accordingly, it should not be concluded, from the limited 
evidence generated so far from perception studies, that shale development does not hold the 
capacity to raise these more global concerns for people – either in different North American States 
or in other countries with different regulatory regimes or media reporting environments. Lack of 
salience of climate change may also be in part due to the way the issue is framed in the studies 
conducted,54 or due to many of the samples being based in areas where shale gas development is 
occurring, suggesting a need for more national-level and ͚upstreaŵ͛  studies85 to explore this issue 
further.  
Risk and benefit distribution  
A major focus in our sample was the degree to which wealth, social costs, and changes in quality of 
life are distributed (un)evenly or (in)equitably amongst a range of actors exposed to shale 
operations46, 52, 55, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 86, 87 (see ref 88 for a recent review). Most of these authors provided 
evidence for uneven distribution of benefits and/or harms associated with development, or for 
people͛s concerns about such uneven distribution. These included concerns about: different 
residents benefiting from those being harmed46, 62, 65, 68; gas companies benefiting whilst residents 
are harmed66, 69; and long-term, generational differences in who benefits or is harmed (e.g., 
benefiting in the short-term, but harming future generations).52, 68 
Views are mixed as to the overall balance of risks and benefits (e.g.,58 89). As would be expected from 
the literature13-16, risk/benefit perceptions appear more nuanced than a simple weighing up of gains 
and losses. For example, while benefits tend to outweigh the risks for Theodori et al.͛s30 participants, 
45% worry that there will be some sort of catastrophic accident involving natural gas extraction in 
the Marcellus Shale, and 46% disagree that any negative impacts of natural gas extraction in this 
region can be fixed. This parallels work that highlights ambivalence in risk perceptions, whereby 
seemingly contradictory survey responses in reality reflect the fact that people believe both risks and 
benefits should be weighed highly at the same time90 - and in the real world, high benefits do often 
accompany high risks.91 Finally, it is also worth noting that the timing of the papers reviewed here is 
likely to influence results. Now that gas prices have fallen causing a contraction of shale operations 
in some areas, and considering more recent commentaries about shale boom-bust cycles,63 
perceptions about the sustainability of benefits may change.  
Attitudes towards hydraulic fracturing for shale gas and oil 
More than half of the publications in our sample offered some degree of attention to overall 
attitudes of support and opposition towards shale operations. This research was again more 
commonly quantitative, though some qualitative studies also addressed these issues. When 
reporting overall levels of support/opposition, most studies relied on percentages or averages of 
linear scales from surveys. However, this might mask important nuances: for example, Jacquet and 
colleagues49, 57 show that while survey respondents exhibited similar average levels of support for 
shale gas and wind energy, their evaluation of shale gas was substantially more bimodal than it was 
for wind energy. As well as taking into account study design, we are again reminded of the 
importance of framing terminology in this context, with respondents in a national US survey showing 
overall support for shale gas development, but opposition to ͚fraĐkiŶg͛.29, 80 
Studies using US national samples36, 39, 44, 45, 48 found slightly more support, on average, than 
opposition. However, they often found that the majority of survey respondents across the US at 
large are undecided on this issue.36, 44 One national-sample study demonstrated general support for 
shale operations in the Midwest and South in the US, but opposition on average in the West and 
Northeast.39 Temporal variation in support/opposition was also manifest. Mazur28 asserted that 
attitudes have become more divided over time, while two studies showed increased opposition over 
time.39, 70 Indeed, both of these can happen when a large number of people are initially undecided 
and then make a judgement, as has occurred with European perceptions of shale operations 
recently.24 Attitudes also vary at regional and local scales: whether this is related to levels of shale 
development in these regions is a question of considerable interest for countries currently debating 
shale development, and is discussed in detail below.  
A number of factors have been shown to be associated with support/opposition. Causality is not 
clear, and to our knowledge no published research offers a rigorous analysis of whether such factors 
lead to attitudes or whether they stem from them (see ref 86 for a discussion). The most commonly 
cited is the (unsurprising) relationship between beliefs about impacts and overall attitudes. For 
example, in top of mind (or ͚free association͛Ϳ tasks, those who more readily cite economic and 
energy supply impacts are more likely to support fracking, whilst those who more readily cite 
environmental impacts are more likely to be opposed.44, 80  
Public perceptions of regulation, decision making and the institutions responsible for development 
Perceptions of regulation and decision making  
Reporting national survey data of those aware of fracking, Davis and Fisk45 find that respondents are 
equally divided in terms of preferring more regulation (45%) and maintaining existing levels of 
regulation (43%), while few (12%) are in favor of reducing regulation. In the US public support for 
regulation varies by state: for example, most Pennsylvanian respondents do not believe that drilling 
taxes would discourage companies from doing business in the state,41, 43 but most Maryland 
participants are concerned that a tax would discourage companies from conducting business there.66 
Regarding whether shale development should be allowed at all, a majority of participants across 
Canada widely support a moratorium on fracking until the government completes a comprehensive 
review of the technology.92  
A number of the articles in this review report a perceived lack of personal control in determining 
development outcomes, consistent with research showing the importance of agency in risk 
responses,93 and the need in turn to view findings about both regulation and institutions (see below) 
from a critical perspective. Willow (p.247)79 in particular found that those who oppose shale 
development associate it with strong feelings of disempowerment, arguing that ͚the activities of a 
powerful industry are infringing on fundamental rights and undermining core democratic ǀalues͛. 
Similarly, Wynveen69 and Israel et al.55 cite a lack of power and local control, including within 
government, with respondents claiming that county and municipal governments have little say in 
these issues. Participants point to development in their community that began without their 
consent, knowledge, or engagement.55, 61 Others yielded to the ͛iŶeǀitaďle͛ to allow shale operations 
(p. 25, ref 94) and were afraid to resist pressure because they felt they might be labelled un-American 
or un-patriotic.70 Simonelli95 refers to this as internal colonization, arguing that when industry moves 
into economically vulnerable rural areas promising financial benefits, communities are often not in a 
position to resist, despite negative environmental and community impacts. In response to these 
power struggles, research has found that landowner coalitions are seen as a way of average citizens 
gaining more power over development decisions by combining collective bargaining power and 
legal/time/financial resources,32 with suggestions that possessing a lease could itself be seen as a 
form of power and/or control.49  
Perceptions of institutions, organizations and other actors  
A dominant theme emerging with regard to public perceptions of various shale stakeholders is 
mistrust - of industry and government in particular, and to a lesser extent of scientists and 
environmental groups (see refs 14, 96 for discussions of the importance of trust in public risk 
perceptions). 
Mistrust of industry is widespread. For example, Ladd58 notes that four in ten respondents were 
skeptical of gas industry promises, while Stedman et al.37 note that many respondents had very little 
or no trust in the natural gas industry (48.8% in New York versus 37.2% in Pennsylvania). Our review 
shows that this mistrust may stem from various factors, including industry exposure, perceived 
unfairness, lack of information provision, and heavy handed corporate tactics, or ͚ďullǇiŶg͛. For 
example, in the Marcellus Shale, over half of participants (72% in New York, 69% in Pennsylvania) 
agreed that the gas industry benefits from natural gas extraction at the expense of local 
communities and citizens.41 Ferrar et al.6 discuss experiences of being denied information or being 
provided with false information, or having their concerns ignored, and Israel et al.55 cite concerns 
relating to the availability and quality of information both by industry and political leaders. 
Interviewees in PeŶŶsǇlǀaŶia͛s Marcellus Shale described being bullied or intimidated by gas 
industry employees and their agents.97 This bullying is not restricted to companies: interviewees also 
described being bullied or intimidated by their neighbors when there were disagreements about the 
pros and cons of gas development; and even by local politicians.97 Similarly, Israel et al.55 describe 
the withholding of information from affected parties by neighbors and medical personnel under ͚gag 
orders͛.  
A number of studies also describe negative perceptions of government with regard to shale 
operations. For example, Stedman et al. 37 found that many respondents had very little or no trust in 
state departments of environmental protection/conservation in the Marcellus shale region, and 
Borick et al. 41 found that both Governor Cuoŵo͛s (New York) and Governor Corďett͛s (Pennsylvania) 
handling of the shale gas issue drew more negative reviews than positive appraisals. Other research 
indicates that views are mixed. Brown et al.42 found that participants tended to be uncertain about 
governor- and legislature actions on hydraulic fracturing in Pennsylvania and Michigan, and Perry70 
finds that many citizens express the belief that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection would not allow shale development if it were truly dangerous, suggesting trust in this 
governmental organization at least.  
In line with research showing that (independent) scientists are consistently amongst the most highly 
trusted sources of scientific information (e.g., 98), Stedman et al.37 and Theodori et al.30 found high 
levels of trust in scientists and ͚eǆperts͛. However, the picture is again mixed. In the US, 
Pennsylvanians have significant doubts about the credibility of scientists on this issue.43 Some 
residents believe that experts have intentionally avoided researching cases of cancer close to wells, 
fearing the implications of potential findings,65 and others raised concerns about possible bias in 
scientific studies funded by industry55; a concern also voiced in the UK recently.99 ͚Trust͛ in experts 
does not of course necessarily translate to attitude change, and whilst Lachapelle and Montpetit50 
note that Quebecers adjust their perceptions of risk when provided with new scientific information, 
they found that even a strong signal from credible experts was unlikely to alter negative attitudes to 
such an extent as to produce overall support. In both Pennsylvania and Michigan some segments of 
the population suggest their perception of hydraulic fracturing will not change in response to an 
expert saying that the risks are either high or low.42 These authors suggest that respondents are 
more likely to believe an expert determination of high risk than low risk associated with shale 
operations42; and it is apparent that, in line with wider risk perception research100, trust in scientists 
is contingent upon factors such as whether the eǆperts͛ views align with the dominant discourse or 
with their own views.101  
The limited coverage in our sample suggests that levels of trust in environmental groups are also 
mixed. Respondents in Pennsylvania and Michigan would more likely turn to environmental groups 
for reliable information on drilling in their state rather than government, industry, or the media,42 
but others37, 43 found that many Pennsylvanians have little trust in environmental groups on this 
issue. Whilst little of the research here focused on media coverage, indications are that 
Pennsylvanians have significant doubts about the credibility of the media on the issue of shale 
operations,45 even though Theodori87 and Evensen et al.29 report that local newspapers are the most 
commonly consulted source of information on this topic in Pennsylvania. 
Comparisons with other energy options 
Findings are consistent with research elsewhere102, 103 that consistently show public preference for 
renewables over fossil fuels. For example, local leaders͛ support for shale operations ranks near last 
when compared with a range of Michigan-specific energy sources that could be developed in the 
state, well behind renewable sources such as wind and solar, and other sources including nuclear 
power.49 Consistent with this, a majority of US respondents in a national survey (58%) say it is more 
important to develop alternative energy sources (e.g., wind, solar, hydrogen technology) compared 
to 34% who think expanding exploration and production of oil, coal and natural gas is the more 
important priority.39 Related to these findings, Israel et al.55 cite interested and affected parties͛ 
concerns about gas development hindering the development of renewable energy resources and 
technologies.  
At the local level, Jacquet and Stedman57 found that although the perceived magnitude of positive 
and negative impacts is greater from natural gas drilling, the types of perceived impact from wind 
and natural gas are similar overall, with traffic perceived as among the most adverse impacts from 
developments. However, wind still proves more popular: Jacquet49 found that landowner attitudes 
towards natural gas drilling tended to be negative, while attitudes towards wind farm development 
were much more mixed, becoming more positive when development occurred, as opposed to more 
negative when drilling began.  
While renewables tend to be the most preferred option, some research shows that natural gas (per 
se) remains more popular than other fossil fuels. In one study this includes the Keystone XL pipeline 
for tar sand oil,48 although Baldassare et al.104 found that even support for this was higher than for 
͚fraĐkiŶg͛. Higher support for gas than other fossil fuels is consistent with research in the UK (RSPB 
Market Research 2001, cited in ref105), and may in part be due to fewer people seeing natural gas as 
a culprit of climate change than oil and coal.48 However, in Pennsylvania fracking for shale gas is seen 
as more negative than even coal in some ways. This stems from the social aspects of development, 
as described by Hudgins61 who notes that unlike coal miners who are a more localized, populous, 
networked labor force with deep roots in the area, much of the labor associated with natural gas 
drilling is diffuse and transient.  
 
WHAT SHAPES PERCEPTIONS OF SHALE OPERATIONS?  
Prior experience of shale operations  
A key question of interest is whether perceptions of shale operations are related to levels of 
development. A number of the papers we reviewed do find that people within states with more 
extensive shale development are more positive. Several studies revealed support, on average, for 
shale operations in Pennsylvania (where shale operations are happening),30, 41, 42, 50, 66 while the 
majority of research on New York (where shale operations are not happening) showed overall 
opposition41, 66 - although one study of residents in New York͛s Marcellus Shale region revealed more 
support.37 The one study that explicitly examined California (where shale development is relatively 
small scale) found more opposition than support104; the same was true of the one study of Maryland 
(where there is a moratorium).66 While two studies showed overall support in Michigan42, 50 (where 
large scale extraction is taking place), one suggested overall opposition.47 In Canada, the limited 
research on Quebec (where there is a moratorium) showed decided overall opposition,50, 89 and 
Nova Scotians (where there is a ban) were also found to be more likely to oppose (53%) than 
support (39%) hydraulic fracturing in the province.106 Notably, while there has been unrest over 
shale development (and a moratorium) in New Brunswick, there is a shortage of published research 
on public perceptions there. On a more local scale in the US, Kriesky et al.33 found that in a 
Pennsylvanian county with more shale activity (Washington County), residents were less likely to 
perceive environmental threat, and more likely to perceive the Marcellus shale as an economic 
opportunity, than in a Pennsylvanian county with less activity (Allegheny County).  
While the majority of the above research indicates that greater levels of development are related to 
higher benefit perceptions and lower risk perceptions (note that we cannot comment on causality), 
other -generally more localized- research shows that the situation is more complex, and that those 
in areas with more development hold more polarized, nuanced, ambivalent, or stronger perceptions 
of both risks and benefits. For example, Theodori60 found that Texans in Wise County (where the 
natural gas industry is more mature) were significantly more likely than Texans in Johnson County 
(where it is less well established), to view one social and/or environmental issue more negatively 
and five economic and/or service-related issues more positively. Work by Schafft et al.59, 107 supports 
this. Schafft et al.͛s survey of school administrators for example suggests that the same people are 
likely to see positive and negative potential and that people who live near sites have greater risk and 
opportunity perceptions than those who live in areas with less activity, with a strong correlation 
between perceived risks and opportunity107. Malin94 also highlights that while participants may 
express support, they may do so because they feel that such development is inevitable.  
The situation is complicated by past energy development as well as contemporary shale operations. 
Interviews by Brasier et al.46 suggest that a regional history of extraction in the Marcellus area 
(coal/shallow natural gas) helps explain perceptions of shale development, perhaps more than level 
of development itself. As an aside, such histories can also complicate the allocation of environmental 
impacts to shale gas because many of the problems may be the legacy of earlier industrial history, 
for example coal mining in the Marcellus108.  
Politics, culture and worldviews  
Perhaps not surprisingly, environmental attitudes have been cited as important in the case of shale 
development.49 For example, amongst aware individuals, those with a pro-environmental policy 
stance were more likely to oppose fracking than those favoring economic development.45 Consistent 
with this, as well as the cultural theory of risk perceptions,109, 110 Lachapelle and Montpetit50 suggest 
that residents of Quebec, being more egalitarian and less individualistic than those in Michigan and 
Pennsylvania, perceive greater risks in the extraction of natural gas from shale, and tend to be less 
convinced of economic benefits. Regarding political orientation, research revealed that Democrats 
were generally prone to oppose development while Republicans were liable to support it.39, 42, 44, 48, 
104, 116 Davis and Fisk45 also found that Democrats were more skeptical of fraĐkiŶg͛s practical uses 
than Republicans, and more likely to favor regulations and disclosure rules.  
Other variables were cited as relevant in a more limited sample of studies: age (younger people 
more likely to oppose)44; being a mineral rights leaseholder (more likely to support)33; association of 
shale gas development with energy independence (more likely to support)70; and rural/urban 
residency (urban more likely to oppose)45. In their survey of government officials, Crowe et al.35 
found that those with higher educational levels were more likely to favor a ban, as are those leaders 
in communities that have a strong economy. Several studies also showed men are more likely to 
support shale operations than women,33, 39, 44, 45, 48 reflecting emerging patterns in the UK111 and 
wider literature on gender effects and local environmental contamination.112 However, it is 
important to recognize current thinking, which is that such ͚gender and risk͛ effects are not due to 
anything inherent to gender per se, but due to the ways in which society regulates individuals of 
different gender, and in intersection with other social location issues (race, social class etc.), shaping 
how some men and women participants from different backgrounds construct their understandings 
of environmental risk and uncertainty differently from each other.113-115 
Overall though there is a need for more in depth research into the way worldviews and cultural 
values influence shale perceptions, and how they interact with the more localized questions of 
identity and sense of place.   
Study design  
Study design can have a large influence on how risk/benefit perceptions are elicited, how the topic is 
perceived by participants, and how results are interpreted. Firstly, we highlighted above that the 
majority of the publications reported here used self-reported measures rather than independently 
assessing knowledge, and how this can introduce bias. Second, in the articles we reviewed, many of 
the studies showing the importance of impacts outside the characteristic economic and 
environmental tropes were qualitative, indicating that survey approaches may constrain the issues 
that are addressed. This potentially points to why certain impacts were discussed less frequently 
than others, and highlights the differential role of varied research approaches. Third, terminology is 
important: Clarke et al.80 found that the terms ͚fraĐkiŶg͛ and ͚shale gas deǀelopŵeŶt͛ elicited 
different risk/benefit perceptions, with perceptions more positive when the term 'shale gas 
development' was used. Drawing on the same data, Evensen et al.34 show how a higher percentage 
of participants felt that the risks outweigh the benefits when the issue was framed as 'fracking' 
versus 'shale gas development' (note however that the terms refer to different aspects of the issue 
and carry different connotations). Interestingly, Kromer66 found regional differences in the 
perception of the word ͞fraĐkiŶg͟.  
 
COMPARISONS WITH UK PERCEPTIONS   
In Europe, where shale development is at a very early stage, public awareness and attitudes have 
tended to be shaped by the debate around whether or not there should be development, rather 
than by direct experience of development.25 Although studies of European shale perceptions have 
been relatively few, the body of research is growing. This is particularly the case in the UK,24 where a 
number of studies have recently been published based on media and policy analysis (e.g., refs 117, 
118), deliberative approaches (e.g., refs 119, 120) surveys including repeated trackers (e.g., refs 113, 121) 
and one in-depth experimental study.122  
This research shows that there has been an increase in awareness and knowledge of shale 
development in the UK since around 2012,113 and a large proportion of respondents now have at 
least a very basic level of awareness. However, few know ͚a lot͛ about shale development,121 and 
publics are largely undecided or ambivalent about the issue: when asked whether they support or 
oppose extracting shale gas, 44% neither support or oppose.121 Indications are that there has been 
growing opposition amongst those who offer an opinion113, 121. Opposition seems to be influenced 
both by events such as the high-profile 2013 Balcombe protests within the UK,113 as well as events 
and media coverage in the US.28  
Some broad similarities emerge between North American and UK findings. As there is greater 
attention paid to risks in US and Canadian research, studies indicate that there is also a greater 
awareness of potential risks than benefits of shale development in the UK,122 and more participants 
feel that the risks outweigh the benefits than vice versa (although 24% ͚doŶ͛t kŶoǁ͛Ϳ.122 Broadly 
consistent with US and Canadian findings, water contamination is amongst the greatest concerns in 
the UK.113, 121, 122 Also consistent with North American perceptions, shale is considered less attractive 
than other energy technologies in the UK, particularly renewables.111, 119, 121, 122 UK research also 
shows that demographics, politics and environmental values are important predictors of 
perceptions, with women for example being shown to be less supportive of shale development than 
men.113, 121, 122  
Also in line with perceptions in North America, public perceptions of decision makers and regulators 
in the UK are commonly negative: participants feel that important decisions have already been taken 
without adequate public consultation, citing for instance that the government has already 
committed to shale development and granted licenses.119, 120 This is alongside negative perceptions 
of energy companies,119 and widespread low trust in both industry and government,120 with doubts 
raised about goǀerŶŵeŶt͛s ability to adequately regulate shale gas,122 and benefit offers perceived 
by some as being akin to bribes.119  
In more subtle ways, UK and North American perceptions may differ, and more research is needed 
to explore this. Generally, the perceptions of risks and benefits in North America appear more 
localized, with less attention to debates around issues such as climate change and energy security 
than in the UK. For example, the most commonly cited reasons for supporting shale development in 
the UK include needing to use all available energy sources, reducing dependence on conventional 
fossil fuels, and energy security (i.e., reducing dependence on other countries for the UK͛s energy 
supply),121 as opposed to the most commonly cited benefits in North America centering around local 
economies and jobs. However, these differences are likely to be at least in part due to a more 
regional/localized focus of many of the North American studies and the more advanced (i.e., 
downstream) stages of development there, whereby localized concerns come to the fore. It is 
important to understand how the framing of the debate at different scales in the US compares to 
the emerging situation in the UK where issues of energy security and climate change are increasingly 
paramount, and thus this is a question that warrants further research.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS  
In some ways, the US and Canada provide a relatively straight forward comparison with other 
countries experiencing or anticipating shale development. The UK, for example, bears many 
similarities in fossil fuel supply technologies, the energy systems currently deployed, and pressures 
to develop reserves of shale gas and oil. There are however a number of important differences, 
including different stages of development, as well as differences in mineral rights ownership, 
geology, population distribution and regulatory contexts. Such differences may have important 
implications for how risks are interpreted in these different contexts, and therefore ultimately 
whether shale development will obtain - and maintain - a social license to operate. So while we can 
learn much that will help to anticipate the emergence of public representations of shale 
development by reviewing what has already occurred in the US and Canada, these studies are not a 
substitute for further research elsewhere. Future work should therefore build upon recent research 
exploring perceptions in other countries, and include cross-national studies to facilitate more direct 
comparisons between national contexts.  
Within North America, most of the reviewed research focused on the US rather than Canada, with a 
strong emphasis on the Marcellus shale formation (particularly in Pennsylvania) and much less 
attention to other shale plays. Future research in North America should therefore focus on regions 
outside of the Marcellus, particularly Canadian provinces and areas in the US where shale 
development is still at relatively early stages (i.e., upstream), for example in California. A focus on 
national contexts and upstream locations may elicit considerations of wider concerns such as climate 
change and energy security, which in downstream settings may be overshadowed by more localized 
concerns like water contamination and traffic.  
A mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches were used in the papers we reviewed, both of 
which offer their own merits, and together provide a more thorough exploration of the issue than 
any one method can alone (see ref 123). However, there is a strong focus on quantitative surveys and 
qualitative interviews, with much less of the research utilizing techniques such as focus groups,124 
deliberative workshops (c.f. 85, 119, 120) or ethnographic approaches.70, 79, 94, 97, 125 Such approaches can 
offer more insight into co-produced meanings and slow-thinking judgements, and would be 
expected to add further layers to current understandings of public perceptions of shale operations.  
More longitudinal research (c.f. 6) is also required to chart perceptions over time, as well as research 
that aims to better understand how personal characteristics such as life experiences affect beliefs.35 
There is also a need for more studies using independent knowledge measures rather than relying on 
self-report measures. This has been done to a limited extent in the UK,111 but we support calls for 
further research in this area,122 perhaps with the development of tailored knowledge scales to gauge 
public knowledge of emerging energy issues (see ref 126 for an example pertaining to climate 
change). Comparative analyses that seek to understand how shale perceptions differ, or are similar 
to, those from other controversial energy technologies127,128 is also a research priority as our 
understanding of this area develops further and the available data grows.  
Finally, the literature reviewed here is about a shale gas industry that expanded rapidly in the last 
decade.1 This period of boom has been followed by a recent decline in activity in some areas due to 
falling oil prices in 2015.1, 129 Alongside this, there is growing evidence of negative environmental 
impacts such as water contamination130 and seismicity associated with waste water injection.131, 132 
In line with these more recent developments, we can expect attitudes to be changing, and more 
recent studies -including those currently being conducted- may reflect an environment of more 
negative evidence. Research should therefore chart these more recent developments.  
 
CONCLUSION 
We carried out a systematic review of 58 research articles published between 2009 and 2015, which 
investigated public perceptions of shale gas/oil extraction via hydraulic fracturing ;͚fraĐkiŶg͛Ϳ in the 
US and Canada.  
Broadly, the literature shows mixed levels of awareness, tending towards higher awareness in areas 
with shale operations. Perceived benefits tend to be economic (e.g., job creation, boosts to local 
economies), while perceived risks tend to be environmental/social (e.g., impacts on water, traffic), 
and public views are mixed as to whether the benefits of shale operations outweigh the risks or vice 
versa. Levels of support and opposition differ across regions within the US and Canada. Views on 
regulation also vary spatially, but there is widespread distrust of the parties responsible (particularly 
industry and government), stemming from perceived unfairness, heavy-handed corporate tactics, 
and a lack of transparency. A number of papers also point to ethical issues concerning risk/benefit 
distribution, procedural justice, trust in risk managers and risk governance, and impacts upon quality 
of life. In common with many other environmental risk issues that have seen intense controversy 
over the years, this combined evidence points to the conclusion that aspects of local context, 
alongside the various dynamics of the interactions over time between affected communities and 
other actors such as developers and regulators, will be critical to the way this technology is 
ultimately viewed in any particular location or nation.  Under such circumstances, and as we have 
argued above,  the acceptability of risk, alongside any social license to operate, can only ever be 
regarded as conditional at best (see16, 127), while the issue of shale development provides yet another 
powerful demonstration that the acceptance (or ultimately rejection) of environmental and 
technological risks involves a range of concerns and value-based questions that go well beyond 
simple knowledge of the science, or for that matter formal measurement of the risk itself. This is 
hardly a surprising conclusion as seen from the perspective of the social sciences, since four decades 
of research has revealed how the question of acceptable risk is always bound up with our values 
and, ultimately, our political choices13, 91. Shale developments seem to bring this consideration to the 
fore in a particularly acute way. In the language of the cultural theory of risk13, 109, 110, the politics of 
hydraulic fracturing centers around whether it should be viewed simply as an efficient outcome of 
global energy markets seeking to exploit the earth͛s resources to meet an ever increasing energy 
demand, or alternatively as the latest incarnation of global capital and large fossil fuel corporations 
taking forward the unsustainable exploitation of the earth͛s resources to the long-term detriment of 
communities, the environment and the global climate. And while legitimate doubts can be voiced 
over the suitability of simple market-based approaches to ever resolve chronic environmental risk 
issues such as global climate change135, 136, our own view is that that public perception research helps 
take forward an important set of issues which should in principle help to improve both the debate 
about the appropriateness of hydraulic fracturing and ultimately societal decision-making itself.           
We find broad similarities between perceptions in the US and Canada and those emerging in the UK, 
where shale development is at the earliest stages. However, we also identify potential differences, 
which may pertain to different research foci and/or levels of development. We suggest that future 
research should further explore these nuances, particularly through in-depth qualitative research, 
longitudinal and cross-cultural studies with national and upstream samples.  
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Methods Study 
citations  
Type of study  Location including shale play and associated states/provinces Sample  Method 
Qualitative 
(N=20) 
Refs 6, 27, 29, 
32, 46, 55, 58, 
61, 65, 67-71, 79, 
94, 95, 97, 124, 
125  
 
18 peer reviewed 
2 grey literature 
17 USA  
11 Marcellus (New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Maryland) 
2 generic (multiple plays) 
2 Barnett (Texas) 
1 Haynesville (Louisiana) 
1 Marcellus & Utica (Ohio) 
2 USA & Canada  
1 Marcellus (New York, Pennsylvania), Frederick Brook Shale 
(New Brunswick) 
1 Marcellus & Utica (Ohio) & non-shale comparison (Ontario)   
1 USA & UK  
10 IAPs* 
7 Communities/residents 
3 Media  
8 interviews 
6 mixed qualitative methods  
3 interviews & focus groups  
2 media content analysis & 
interviews  
1 interviews & ethnographic 
research  
2 qualitative analyses of open ended 
survey items   
2 ethnographic research  
1 focus groups  
1 media analyses  
Quantitative 
(N=30) 
Refs 30, 31, 
33-39, 41-45, 47-
50, 56, 57, 60, 
66, 80, 87, 92, 
101, 104, 106, 
107, 116 
16 peer reviewed 
14 grey literature  
26 USA  
14 Marcellus (New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Maryland) 
7 generic (multiple plays)  
4 Barnett (Texas)  
1 Monterrey (California)  
3 Canada 
1 generic (multiple plays)  
1 Utica (Quebec)  
1 Horton Group (Nova Scotia)  
1 USA & Canada  
1 Utica (Quebec) & Marcellus (Michigan, Pennsylvania)  
24 general population  
6 IAPs  
 
13 telephone surveys 
7 hard copy / mail surveys 
4 online surveys 
4 mixed quantitative methods  
2 online and hard copy surveys 
2 telephone and hard copy surveys 
1 analyses of roll call votes 
1 unspecified survey  
 
 
Mixed 
methods 
(N=3) 
Refs 28, 59, 
123 
3 peer reviewed 
 
2 USA  
1 Marcellus (Pennsylvania) 
1 generic (multiple plays)  
1 USA, UK & Australia  
2 IAPs  
1 media & polling data  
 
1 archival and focus group 
1 media analyses & polling data 
1 online survey, interviews, focus groups 
Review (N=5) 
 
Refs 7, 52, 62, 
86, 89 
3 peer reviewed 
2 grey literature  
3 USA  
3 generic (multiple plays)  
1 Canada  
1 general overview of new energy technologies  
5 reviews  5 reviews  
Totals  
(58 articles) 
 40 peer reviewed  
18 grey literature  
 
48 USA 
4 Canada  
3 USA & Canada  
2 USA & other  
1 general overview of new energy technologies 
24 general population  
18 IAPs  
7 communities / residents 
5 reviews  
3 media  
1 media & polling data   
 
 
                                                          
* IAPs: interested and affected parties including government officials, landowners, farmers, and education professionals.   
 
